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Felt. The Eastern Railroad of Massachusetts

1873

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THE

EASTERN RAILROAD

OF MASSACHUSETTS ;

ITS BLUNDERS, MISMANAGEMENT & CORRUPTION.

BY

MR. CHARLES W. FELT,

PROPRIETOR OF THE "ENGLISH-AMERICAN."

PRICE TEN CENTS—POSTAGE TWO CENTS.

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Gift of
Hon. Charles Sumner,
of Boston.
(H.U. 1830.)

DEPOSITED IN THE
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NOTE.

I think it proper to call attention to the fact, that the conductors of the *Salem Gazette* have shown two marked lines of policy, viz.: that of attack upon individuals, and the defence of corporations. How far the attacks of the *Gazette* upon myself can be justified I leave for others to decide; but I think all conversant with the facts will agree that the *Gazette's* defence of corporations has been unfortunate, if we name no others than the Eastern Railroad, or the Salem and Danvers Aqueduct Companies. I do not desire to quarrel with the *Gazette*, and did not in my first lecture allude to that paper more than others, but I would say to the editors, "If the garment suits thee it is at thy service."

TO SUBSCRIBERS.

I trust the first subscribers will acquiesce in the delay in issuing this pamphlet, as it has arisen from causes which greatly prolonged my stay in America, and I hope the additional matter inserted will be a full compensation for that delay. Copies may be obtained by addressing the "Messrs. White, Gazette Office, Montreal, Canada," and of all news agents.

August, 1873.

Miss GREEN would take this opportunity to announce to her English advertisers that after January next the *English American* will be published at the Office of the *American Justifier*, in Boston, U.S., and be distributed on the days of sailing among the passengers leaving America by steamer.

THE EASTERN RAILROAD.

OF MASSACHUSETTS.

On the 12th of November last, I delivered a lecture in Salem, Massachusetts (my native town), drawing comparisons between ENGLAND, the DOMINION of CANADA, and the UNITED STATES. In such a lecture, written almost at the moment of the Boston fire, I could hardly avoid making some allusion to that calamity, while the growing importance of the railway question forced that subject also upon my attention. The fact that several of my townsmen were heavy losers by the fire, drew attention to my criticisms, and so far as I know they met with the approval of those best qualified to judge. There can be but one opinion on the fact that the Boston architects had been competing with each other for many years to produce buildings in defiance of *law* and common sense, that would make the most show and cost the least money. And as the finest warehouses in Boston burned like chaff on a fine calm November night, no honest man can dispute the fairness of holding the "best" architect as the most guilty person. Whatever the origin of the fire, or however great the delay, or inefficiency on the part of the fire department, it would never have crossed Franklin and Devonshire streets had not those buildings been *wooden buildings* with the least possible covering of slate and granite.

The Boston fire caused the failure of many insurance companies. It caused a special session of the Legislature to pass an act which the Supreme Court promptly pronounced unconstitutional. Application was made to Congress to give the sufferers the benefit of temporary Free Trade as it did to Chicago. It was found that the funds of Harvard College had been seriously impaired by the fire, and the pay of some of the professors cut off; while the Agassiz Museum was compelled to apply to the Legislature for assistance. Another large fire has since occurred, in the day time, which shows how profoundly the Boston people had slumbered in fancied security, and yet the *Salem Gazette* took me to task in elegant language, "for lugging in by the neck and heels" that then recent and most momentous occurrence. If the editors of the *Salem Gazette* would not tolerate allusion to the *Boston fire* it is a curious question what they would deem

appropriate matter for a lyceum lecture. But I will give them credit for sufficient common sense to suppose that no exceptions would have been taken had I made no allusion to the Eastern Railroad, a corporation as corrupt as the Erie or the Pacific railroads, and for which the *Salem Gazette* stands sponsor; its principal editor holding or having held an interest in the shares of the company; both editors holding free passes over the road and branches, and receiving regular invitations to all the free dinners for which the stockholders' money is spent, while copies of the *Gazette* are carried gratis in the railway trains.

In connection with a second lecture upon "Our Railways" I made some reply to the *Gazette*, to which the editors replied with a leaded editorial of personal abuse. This is a fair illustration of the way in which the power of the press is sometimes abused, but the Yankees are as fond of fair play as John Bull, and such attacks ultimately help the intended victim. In New York, James Fisk, Jr., could buy a judge with money, but in Massachusetts an interest in railway shares, a free pass, free dinners, or free carriage of newspapers, will buy an editor, and cause him to pour sweet praises upon incompetent railway managers, and to suppress every word of honest criticism. The Eastern Railroad managers have purchased the local press, and advertised their railroad as "one of the best managed in the country," while the statistics published by the Railroad Commissioners show that of the fifteen principal Massachusetts railways the Eastern had killed and injured more than any other. This was *before* the Revere disaster. In view of the alarming number of casualties the *Boston Advertiser* said last October, "If there is such a thing as ill-luck surely the Eastern Railroad has fallen into it." What right the *Boston Advertiser* had to depreciate the value of shareholders' property by such appeals to popular superstition we leave for its editors to decide, but a much more manly course would be to look the causes of such "ill-luck" fairly in the face. It is unlucky only because the newspapers have made it appear to be a *safe* railway when it was notoriously unsafe; and are not corrupt editors as great enemies to society as corrupt judges? The first aim of the managers of the Eastern Railroad has been, not the safety of passengers, but to retain their positions. Corrupt editors have always been as ready to publish anything the railway managers desire as Judge Barnard was to grant injunctions to suit James Fisk, Jr. These editors have a most commendable horror of the corruption and mismanagement on the Vermont Central, the Erie, the Pacific, and other distant railways, just as some Christians have a great horror of the wicked Jews who lived in Judea 2000 years ago, but are conveniently shortsighted and deaf when sinners near at hand are to be seen or mentioned.

The Eastern is a very short railroad, being about forty miles *long* from Boston to the state line, and a portion of this is single track. It has several short branches, and operates one or two

connecting roads, all of which are single track, and some of them of little use except in warm weather. It has, however, considerable importance as being until recently the only line which connected the State of Maine with New Hampshire, Massachusetts and the other States. It is true that there have always been two lines running from Boston and taking passengers to Portland, but the Boston and Maine has until the present year been greatly fettered by using 38 miles of one of the connecting roads of the Eastern railroad to reach Portland. The Boston and Maine has now a new and complete line from Boston to Portland, and there are three other lines completed, or now in progress, which pass from Maine to New Hampshire and the West, so that Maine is not to the same extent as formerly dependent upon the Eastern railroad; yet from the peculiar geographical position of Maine she will always have much at stake in the management of the Eastern Railroad, especially if that road should control, as it has heretofore, the policy of the Boston and Maine railroad, at one time carrying things with such a high hand as to leave a train of Boston and Maine passengers bound for Portland at South Berwick for several hours, because the managers of the Boston and Maine would not submit to the control of the Eastern. While the Eastern railroad had the monopoly of the business, the state of Maine was forced to be content with two trains per day. Under the present system of competition, Portland receives daily about fifteen trains over the various roads from the West. Is it to be wondered at that the population of Maine has been until recently stationary, and even decreasing?

The Eastern Railroad was completed with money loaned by the State of Massachusetts, at only five per cent. When the loan matured the Eastern railroad could not pay it, and asked for an extension of the time, and permission to pay the loan in instalments, which was granted. A considerable proportion of the amount was payable during the Rebellion, and while the State paid its indebtedness in gold, the Eastern railroad paid principal and interest in paper, causing a loss to the Commonwealth of \$242,090.10 up to January 1st, 1870. Subsequent losses make the amount about \$300,000 (on a loan of \$500,000), a large proportion of which has been abstracted from the School and other State Funds. Similar bonds were due to individuals, with whom the railroad company effected a compromise by exchanging other gold bonds for their own, by which the individuals got their money. Why the Commonwealth was not permitted to get its own even in this round-about-way does not appear, for the state officers seem to have been equally as active as private holders. During the controversy private holders were told that it was a patriotic duty to take paper money for Eastern Railroad sterling bonds payable in London in gold! It was amusing to see George M. Browne, a rank copperhead, impugning the patriotism of the late Charles G. Loring, who was acting for the

Massachusetts General Hospital, when Mr. Loring was urging forward the work of recruiting, and sending his son, bearing his own name, to the front.

This road was managed for the first ten years without injuring a passenger, but since that time it has suffered doubtless more severely, in proportion to its length, than any other railroad, either in Europe or America; and all the great calamities have been directly traceable to gross carelessness and trifling with human life. In 1848 a train containing Marblehead passengers was nearly destroyed at Castle Hill, within the limits of Salem, killing six passengers, and wounding forty more. In this case the railroad Company could only offer that a man was ordered to be at the spot in case the trains met at the switch, and stop one of them; but it was proven that the man was to perform this duty at midnight, and to encounter all the contingencies of a walk of a mile alone. He failed to stop the train, and the Company was held to have made insufficient provision, and paid heavy damages to the sufferers. This accident placed the Eastern railroad at the bottom of the list of Massachusetts railways in point of safety *twenty five years ago*, a position from which it has not recovered, but latterly it seems to have made a plunge downward worse even than ever before. There was in 1862 a collision at Hamilton, near Salem, five persons being killed, or dying from the effects of the collision, and about thirty five were injured. This occurred after a long series of minor accidents and narrow escapes, which should have proved sufficient notes of warning, and enforced a high degree of carefulness. But the superintendent, Jeremiah Prescott, negligently gave orders for one train to meet another without notifying the second train to wait for the first, there being only a single track. His defence was that he meant to have given verbal notice to the conductor, but forgot it. In other words he deliberately wrote an order for one train, and left the other to chance. Prescott was forced to resign. It came before the grand jury of Essex County, and had the subject been investigated it would doubtless have led to measures which would have prevented the Revere disaster. No one had the nerve to press forward an investigation. The newspapers had nothing to say about this criminal blunder, but helped to cover it up. The record of the inquest had to be searched out at the coroner's house in Ipswich, and every possible obstacle seemed to prevent that investigation which the safety of passengers demanded. This was taken advantage of, and a man who had been employed upon the railway was sent about with a petition asking for the reappointment of Prescott. Many refused to sign it, but no notice was taken of their protests. Prescott was reappointed, if indeed the resignation was anything more than an attempt to deceive the public.

In 1871 there was the Revere disaster, thirty killed and fifty seven wounded, the worst railway calamity that ever happened

in Massachusetts. It was caused by the express train for Bangor, Maine, overtaking a local train. It was about half past eight, on a Saturday evening, and occurred at Revere, a few miles out of Boston. Disorder and confusion arising from bad management had prevailed during the afternoon and evening; all the trains being sent out of Boston behind the advertised time, when at eight o'clock the express train was dispatched promptly, no warning being given to any train in advance, and no precaution taken except to tell the engineman of the express train to look out for trains ahead. Even this order was verbal, and was sent through another person, from the superintendent, Prescott, (the one who "resigned" because of his blunder at Hamilton in 1862), to the engine driver. He had not independence and firmness enough to keep the slow trains behind and send on the express train first. The conductor of the accommodation train which was run into, from the looseness prevailing that day, felt that he had ample time, and no doubt seems to have been entertained, by any of the men belonging to this train, that the express train, as well as all the other trains, would be delayed. But it was not, and the superintendent sent on the train, with a simple warning to the engine driver. The engine driver could only rely upon seeing the tail lights, which were ordinary lanterns, and were not seen till too late to avert the disaster. The danger was apparent to one of the officials, a brother of one of the directors, in season to have prevented the disaster, but the lax management had provided no caution signal, and he had not sufficient presence of mind to stop the train. The crash into the rear car of the accommodation train was most severe, and among the injured were many gentlemen of prominence. The grossest mismanagement in every detail was proven, and no attempt was made to deny the liability of the corporation, but with only a single lawsuit, the directors proceeded to settle claims to the amount of perhaps a million of dollars. The blame for this calamity, or rather massacre, has been put upon the conductor (Nowland) of the accommodation train. How far this is just will depend somewhat upon Nowland's record, which was good, he having been employed many years, and no previous charge was brought against him. How far the superintendent was in fault, and whether he has in previous cases sought to throw blame upon conductors, is something we may leave for the present, and examine the following statement of four of the greater calamities this road has suffered, omitting many not so fatal, and a large percentage of hair-breadth escapes.

November 3rd, 1848, at Castle Hill, Salem.....	6	killed	40	wounded.
September 17th, 1862, at Hamilton	5	"	35	"
August 26th, 1871, at Revere	30	"	57	"
October 22nd, 1872, at Seabrook.....	2	"	20	"
	43		152	

Total killed and wounded, 195.

The first three of these calamities, causing death or injuries to *one hundred and seventy-three persons*, occurred upon a little piece of road not fifteen miles long; and the last one was at Seabrook, New Hampshire, the first town across the State line, and occurred scarcely a year latter than the Revere disaster. What the full death record of this short railway may be, I have no heart to inquire, if such a total can be gathered from only four calamities. The Seabrook disaster may be regarded as in part, an inheritance of the demoralization that preceded the calamity of the year previous. A switch was wrong, and another through express train, this time from Bangor and Augusta, Maine, crushed into a train waiting on a siding, with even greater force than at Revere. Fortunately the waiting train was a goods train, and while at Revere no one in the Bangor train was injured, at Seabrook, two citizens of Maine were instantly killed, and twenty others injured. The fact that both these calamities arose from the Bangor express trains, shows simply that the managers of the Eastern Railroad, are incompetent to run express trains with any reasonable guarantee of safety. It is true that the Seabrook disaster occurred from a misplaced switch, which the operatives charge upon some miscreant. This is not a very reasonable theory, since the calamity occurred at four o'clock in the morning, and in a lonely place. But we must inquire how it was that the switch had no signal to show the engineer of the coming train that it was wrong, and that the lights which should have warned him, were burning to waste in the goods train? The Railroad Commissioners called attention to improved switches two years since, and the fact that a new manager of the Eastern Railroad was installed soon after the Revere disaster, who has been profuse in introducing improvements, leads us to ask why improved switches had not been introduced, for it was apparent to the most careless observer that the main line was not safe for express trains without them. Singularly enough, this manager had expended \$60,000 for a series of electric signals to prevent fast trains from running into slow trains. This seemed like shutting the barn door after the horse was stolen. The signals however, were hardly completed, before the same Bangor express was nearly destroyed by running into the goods train, at Seabrook. The electric signals, I am assured on what should be good authority, cannot be depended upon, but however that may be, they were not so necessary as good switches, which would have cost only a fraction of the money.

Besides the fault of an old switch, it is a fact, that while the air brakes were on some of the cars of the Bangor express at Seabrook, they were so placed that *they could not be used*. This seems stupid enough, but in order to put the air brakes out of reach of the engine driver, it was necessary to put some light (and weak) cars which were crushed immediately behind the engine, and in front of the heavy cars having the air brake.

How far the manager was responsible for this blunder, we presume was not inquired into by the accommodating coroner's jury. Had both trains at Seabrook, been passenger trains, as at Revere, the former would have been much more fatal than the latter. The circumstances, too, seem equally blameworthy, for the calamity may be traced to four distinct causes, the absence of either of which would have prevented or greatly modified the result. Each of these four causes were easily preventable, and yet they were all allowed to conspire on that fatal morning. They are as follows:

1. Misplaced switch.
2. No signal upon the switch to show that it was wrong.
3. Air-brakes placed out of reach of the engine-driver.
4. Light cars placed between heavy cars and the engine.

But the railroad managers claim that two coroners' juries acquitted them of all blame, and we may well inquire how far corporations manipulate coroners' juries. However, the stockholders' money has been largely drawn upon to pay the damages for persons killed and wounded and property destroyed. Since the Seabrook disaster the editors who are owned by the Eastern Railroad say that "accidents will happen," however hard managers try to prevent them. They keep up a continual "puffing," and the Eastern Railroad rivals Ayer's Pills and Dr. Goodhue's bitters in its efforts to keep before the public, and offset the fact that for *twenty-five years* it has been the most unsafe road in Massachusetts, and that the later record is far worse than the earlier. But how can those newspapers call the Eastern Railroad "one of the best managed railways in the country"? Do they mean to say this in defiance of facts? Are they ignorant, and yet presuming to instruct the public, or are they corrupt and interested parties?

But the Eastern Railroad has been "unfortunate" not only in safety of passengers, but financially as well. With two such thriving places as Lynn and Salem, near to Boston, and controlling the whole business of the State of Maine for several years, this road had resources which its managers have recklessly squandered, and it will lose heavily in the race of competition which their folly has invited and stimulated. It is a significant fact that, notwithstanding the position of the Eastern Railroad, the Boston and Maine has for several years carried *sixty per cent.* of the Maine passengers. The second treasurer of the Eastern Railroad, William S. Tuckerman, was appointed because his services could be obtained for a moderate compensation. He was finally a defaulter to the amount of about half a million dollars. Tuckerman over-issued shares, and then falsified his books, and he even deceived an investigating committee, so that they praised him for his accuracy and admirable methods!

The present treasurer of the Eastern Railroad has a system of accounts which can be made to mean anything the directors

want, and the chances are that the Revere disaster cost a million of money. It amounts to an actual falsification of accounts when unpleasant items are reduced and the amount added to the debt, and covered up in the accounts by excessive valuation of property on hand. The directors do not dare give the items of the cost of the Revere disaster. In a case like that they could not adopt the shameful course of making a statement in their report which was absolutely false, as they did at the time of the Hamilton calamity, and compel the sufferers to accept nominal damages. But yet they have adopted a course in dealing with the sufferers which will not bear exposure to either stockholders or the public. For instance, they will not acknowledge how much they paid to William Lloyd Garrison, jun. They could not hoodwink one bearing the name of the great Abolitionist, and they know that the damages paid to others would have been greatly increased if the amount paid to Garrison was made known [\$2(?),000.]

The natural sequel of such a wretched financial record as this (one involving a suspension of dividends at one time for several years), is the old remedy—borrowing. They cannot pay the cost of the Revere calamity and pay dividends, and so they issue bonds, and propose to try enough of them to pay the Revere damages, on the London market, at six per cent. through Baring and Brothers. An appropriate name for them would be the Revere Calamity Bonds. Why does the Eastern Railroad offer six per cent. in London in gold, besides commissions for negotiating? Massachusetts gets money at five per cent., and the Eastern Railroad got a large loan at the same rate thirty years ago from the State of Massachusetts—a loan for which they showed no gratitude, in paying principal and interest in paper to the great loss of the commonwealth. The State of Massachusetts could borrow money in England at four per cent. did not so many bankrupt railways come forward asking money at high rates, and lowering the reputation of American securities abroad. The subject of borrowing money in England is one in which many—very many parties are interested. Americans, living in England, do not like to be twitted in relation to bad investments which Englishmen may make in America, tempted by high rates of interest. If Englishmen buy bonds paying interest higher than usual, they should at least find out why so high a rate is offered. A New England railway, like the Eastern, should borrow money in London at five per cent., and the reasons why they will pay six and a large commission to Barings, are, that it is the most unsafe road in Massachusetts; that the damages from casualties, the loss from defaulters, the cost of buying rival roads, and other great losses far exceed the amount they now wish to borrow; that the management is incompetent and unworthy of confidence; and, finally, that these evils have been of long and gradual growth, and demand the most energetic remedies. But the Barings, of course, conceal all these facts (if they know them) as carefully as

a jockey conceals the defects of a worthless horse. The *people* of America have a right to complain of each and every one of these transactions, where railroads which cannot pay dividends without borrowing money, are introduced upon the London Exchange by bankers who think more of their own commissions than the honor or credit of the country they profess to represent. Especially have the people of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont a right to complain. These States have been for twenty-five years nearly stationary, or losing population. It is worth estimating how far the monopoly of the Eastern Railroad, by running only two trains per day to Portland (there are now about *fifteen* from the west daily) contributed to, or caused in some measure, this condition of things in Maine and New Hampshire. These States have urgent reason to economise everything, particularly the rate of interest they pay on the money needed in the new careers of prosperity upon which they are now entering. These States cannot borrow money in London on the same terms as Canada, viz., *four per cent.*, if their way is blocked by bankrupt railways. If New England must compete with Canada, she must have money at equally low rates. The New England States can offer most undoubted security, and of that class which it is for the interest of the *people* of the United States should be recognised as safe investments in Europe. It would undoubtedly be true economy for Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont to hire the money for their own railroads, rather than allow them to bid for it at high rates at home or abroad. Some of the best situated lines of railway in New England are now paying seven per cent. for money. It is the *people* who are finally made to pay the high interest which the railroads pay. If these three States should take this course, it would produce a great effect in Massachusetts, for the latter State depends greatly upon the States to the north and east of her territory, and a reduction in the rate of interest may make New England as prosperous as New York.

That there may be no dispute about the financial facts of the railway under special consideration, let us examine the following table. The last item should be explained:—It seems that for years a standing quarrel has existed between the residents of Lynn and the managers of the Eastern Railroad in regard to the location of the station, and report has it that private parties were induced to build a new station, which the Eastern Railroad Company bound themselves first to *hire*, and then to buy. Certain it is that a fine new station was built, but never used, and since has been demolished. The Company paid the bills. It was simply a costly and unsuccessful attempt to *evade a law*. ■

No city along the route is a better patron to the Eastern Railroad than Lynn, but in the case of the new depot the Company did not hesitate to break a solemn compact, greatly affecting the value of large properties. The city is controlled by the Eastern Railroad, for it has no rival railroad, unless one projected should

prove worthy of mention, by giving to Lynn permanent competition between that place and Boston.

Cost of Castle Hill calamity.....	\$300,000
Tuckerman Defalcation.....	400,000
Hamilton Collision.....	150,000
Revere Disaster.....	750,000
Seabrook Calamity.....	500,000
Rival Routes	500,000
Lynn Depot.....	400,000

Total....\$3,000,000

The Railroad officials will make the total somewhat less than this, but it is probable that a full and fair estimate of all the immediate losses from these seven sources, would make a total of fully three millions of dollars. All the other accidents, speculations, and frauds cannot be less than two millions additional, making a total of FIVE MILLION DOLLARS WASTED. We may be quite sure that had the Eastern Railroad been free from preventible disasters and losses by fraud, the shareholders would be five millions of dollars better off to-day. No wonder this corporation crosses the Atlantic to borrow money at high rates, and lower American credit in Europe; but this is a queer situation for "one of the best managed railroads in the country."

While horse railway managers are doing everything to ensure honest returns of money, the Eastern Railroad offers a premium on dishonesty; and yet a complete remedy is at hand. Among those employed as conductors was John Smith Robinson. Robinson did not get rich fast enough, and after he had been appointed to the charge of the Teaming Establishment, he stole from an express car, \$5000 in gold. It leaked out afterwards that Robinson was united with Prescott, (the superintendent) in a plan to buy the Teaming Establishment; Prescott was to retain his position, and of course, influence the teaming in his own favor as much as possible. Robinson was arrested in the act of counting the gold, but this was a case where the public was "made to think." Robinson was insane, and he was put in the hospital for a short time, but no one thought him insane before or afterwards. His only insanity was in being so careless. If he had only waited a little longer to count the money, he might have divided the profits of the teaming business, with Mr. Superintendent Prescott, and used the stolen \$5000 as the capital, both of them eating as parasites into the pecuniary vitals of the corporation, of which they both were servants.

These two men, Robinson and Prescott, were once conductors, and how far the latter has been in the habit of putting blame upon other conductors is a matter worthy of inquiry, since his infamous attempt to charge the Revere disaster upon conductor Nowland. In 1856 an order was issued which endangered several trains, but fortunately produced nothing more than the *delay of a long freight train at Salem, and an extra engine at*

Ipswich from about 6 p.m. till relieved by the trains of the next morning. For this Prescott sought to blame conductor Elijah B. Young, but ultimately finding the blame attached to himself he could never forgive Young, and finally crowded him off the road. About the same time conductor Leighton became suspicious of a verbal order communicated to him one morning by conductor Elbridge A. Towle, and repeated by the depot master at West Lynn, and by sending a man ahead stopped a train coming on the same track. This was at Revere, and Leighton, instead of taking to himself credit for his sagacity, covered up Prescott's blunder by telling the passengers that it was all "understood." Conductor Towle was blamed, but he maintained that he gave the order just as it was given to him; and Prescott was silent, because he had no witness, and could not say what a systematic manager should be able to say, that he never gave *verbal* orders for the movement of trains. At Hamilton, Prescott attempted to throw blame upon conductor Dockham, but there again he was wrong himself, and was finally forced to "resign." With all these previous unsuccessful attempts to fasten blame upon conductors, and the number of times Prescott has been himself the forgetting or neglecting party (and many others can be quoted), it is a little singular that the stigma upon Nowland should seem to stick. The succeeding annual report of the Directors blames Prescott, yet Prescott holds his place (nominally), and Nowland remains "suspended." Is this because Nowland is a poorer man than Prescott? This will be suspected, and we do well to remember that such gross and cowardly injustice is of the same character as that which enabled a Trades' Union secretary in Sheffield to instigate and carry out several murders so successfully, that the plot was only unravelled by a Parliamentary Commission, which was forced to grant pardons in advance to the murderers. And the chief of them—Broadhead—has recently visited America, but he quickly returned—be it said to the credit of our laboring people—to Sheffield, as his most congenial home; for in America he found his infamy had preceded him, and that his murders did not have that quasi-parliamentary sanction which they have in England. But these murders were the immediate result of injustice to working men, such as has been visited upon conductor Nowland. This sense of injustice bound great masses of men together, and made them desperate enough to commit murder, or anything else to secure reform. This is a dark page of England's recent history, and one that Englishmen do not put in the foreground. But it is to be found in English Blue Books, and it certainly means something if an instigator of twenty murders can compel Parliament to give a pardon, in advance, for himself and all his accessories, in the middle of the nineteenth century, as the price of learning how the victims were shot down, time and again, while the police could gain no clue to the perpetrators.

American working men are a law-abiding people, but they are

not insensible to the terrible and unjust punishment inflicted upon conductor Nowland, while no punishment, or even loss of pay, is visited upon superintendent Prescott, who was responsible for the miserable disorder which culminated in sending out a number of accommodation trains, all behind time, as rapidly as possible, and then sending out an express train, which could hardly fail to overtake one of them, as it did. The danger was clearly seen by the superintendent at the moment, but all the precaution he took was to send a *verbal* message to the engine-man, and this was not clearly understood, and if it had been the signals were insufficient, and a total failure. This miserable inefficiency was apparent at every point, and the only wonder is that a Revere disaster did not happen long before, and it was as likely to have happened to the train of any other conductor as to that of Nowland. But Prescott retains his post, nominally at least, and draws his salary. He has "resigned" once, because of his blunder at Hamilton. He resigned again just before the Revere disaster, and was to take charge of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and a successor was appointed, John Thompson, chief machinist, a good man, but wholly unequal to the post, and he immediately resigned, after shuddering at the responsibility attaching to such blunders as that at Revere. Prescott was expected to remain and reform a management which had proved so cruelly faulty, while the Northern Pacific directors (to put it in no stronger terms) were quite willing he should. They knew very well that they could not sell a bond in London, with the author of the Revere disaster for a manager. Prescott's editors said he was retained at an increased salary, and was to have full charge of the road; but the impression seems to be now that it would be difficult to induce him to "resign" for a third time, even if his pay was cut down one half. The disasters at Hamilton and Revere and Seabrook were even more fatal to him than to the sufferers. He was found to be wholly incompetent for the task of reorganising the Eastern Railroad, and a manager was appointed at the earliest opportunity. Prescott, although nominally in his old position, is really in an inferior one. The Eastern Railroad is now operated in divisions, and Prescott is superintendent of one of the divisions, under the manager. Of how much use such a man can be it is hard to see. It is true he has been "educated" at the expense of the Eastern Railroad, and his education has been *liberal*, if we are to judge by what his blunders have cost the Company; but it is a question whether he is now worth his salary. The men cannot respect an officer with such a record, especially when they know that he has attempted to support his own position by false and unmanly imputations against one of their own number.

But the conclusive reply to all complaints now is, that a new manager is now in charge. A new president was chosen a year *since*, and it is claimed that now the road is under a manage-

ment that should command the confidence of the public. Under this "new" management the Seabrook disaster has happened, involving four blunders. How many other causes of complaint there may be, we have no means of knowing, and can only mention a few out of many. A gentleman took note of the late trains advertised to run after the great Boston torchlight procession in October last, and was led into a serious error, for only one train was run, although *trains* were advertised. The night before the Presidential Election a few gentlemen went to Marblehead to attend a political meeting. An extra train was run in both directions, but no information could be got even as late as 7 p.m. The train started without any notice being given, and at least three gentlemen walked from Marblehead to Salem. At Christmas it took from 4 p.m. to 2 a.m. to transport passengers from Boston to Salem. The day was snowy, but with proper snow-ploughs and good management, the road should have been kept open, as the trains run about every half hour, especially as the manager is said to have three daily storm reports all along the line. The second anniversary of the Revere calamity was signalized by another "accident;" and within the week there were three, viz., at Ossipee, Rowley, and North Berwick. These casualties resulted in great damage to property and severe injuries to persons, but the facts are suppressed as far as possible. With such a record of one great failure and many minor ones, the "new" management of the Eastern Railroad has yet to gain the confidence of the public.

But there is no new management. It is the old wolf in sheep's clothing. The road is still under the same control—that of the Hooper Family, the head of which is Hon. Samuel Hooper, M. C., of Boston. I make no attack upon family control. The largest stockholders have a right to control their property—it is the right of the majority—majority of shares. But majorities must respect minorities, and how far the Hooper family have done this may be judged by the fact that they have repeatedly held stockholders meetings in rooms only large enough to accommodate the family and their friends.

Upon the books of the Adjutant General of Massachusetts we find the following reference to the Hooper family. "July 11th, 1853, Samuel Hooper, appointed Engineer 2nd division M. V. M. with rank of Major (new office). Discharged August 6th, 1853, having moved out of bounds of his command" This means that Samuel Hooper had no qualifications for the post, but his object was simply to print "Major Hooper" on his cards and flourish as a butterfly military officer upon a European trip upon which he started at the time of his appointment. Governor Clifford is entitled to credit for promptly discharging the would-be major, for it is such pretenders who greatly injure the American military reputation in Europe. This Mr. Hooper has been for several years member of Congress, but notwithstanding his position as

chairman of the finance committee, and other arduous duties, he has found time to speculate in confiscated rebel property in the vicinity of Washington. Another exhibition of the same delicate sense of propriety led the *honourable* head of the Hooper family to become an original shareholder in the *Credit Mobillier*, and vote in Congress the bonds and lands to secure to himself most enormous profits without assuming any pecuniary risk, because the money and the faith of the people were pledged. Mr. Hooper is a director of the Eastern railroad, and his son-in-law is the present president. With such a record at the fountain head, can we wonder that corrupt streams flow out in every direction?

Like all corrupt corporations the Eastern Railroad has entered the field of politics. It elected the last mayor of Salem, and made a fight for him again, but he was defeated by a small majority. The Eastern railroad managers have a well founded spite against the present mayor, for one of the directors once waited upon him with a free pass, which he had the audacity to decline. It is important for corrupt railways to control local governments, and such a show of independence as this cannot be permitted. The advantage of considering political elements was shown last year, when the Eastern railroad Company got a bill through the Massachusetts Legislature, after repeated adverse votes, to take land in Boston from the Boston and Maine railroad in opposition to the opinion of the Railroad Commissioners. This land was in constant use by the latter Company as an important portion of its freight accommodation in Boston. It would perhaps be hard to prove specific corruption, and yet this could only have come from practical corruption, of which there are many forms. The members of the Legislature living along the line will not deny that they have taken passes from the Eastern Railroad Company, and they cannot deny having ridden free for a whole session, while they have taken from the treasurer of the Commonwealth their full mileage. This is corruption without penalties, the most dangerous kind for the people. The subject of free passes is so commonly spoken of, that it is supposed to be a trifling matter, but a permanent free pass on a Massachusetts Railway cannot be worth less than \$250 per year to one living on the line. These passes are issued to editors, prominent politicians, and even judges of Massachusetts courts. They are continued year after year, sometimes for twenty years, and each recipient takes, say from \$1000 to \$2500 money value. This is from a single company, while frequently the same individual has passes from several roads, equal in the aggregate to as much more, or from \$2000 to \$5000 as the aggregate advantage for the whole time one person may hold such passes. This is a reasonable estimate, but it is not the whole, for much as men love money, none are insensible to privilege and power; and the regal and proprietary privilege of using railways without payment, is

esteemed, as even more precious than its money value. Now if legislators and judges take these passes, can they honestly decide questions between railroad companies on one side, and the people on the other? If a member of the Legislature with a free pass in his pocket, speaks upon railway questions, is he an advocate for the railways or a representative of the people? I do not want to call to account the members from Barnstable or Berkshire, whom I do not know, but I will ask if Dr. Loring, who I do know, is the man of the people or the creature of the railways? I have none but the kindest feelings for Dr. Loring, who was a friend to me before his hard earned popularity, and he did me the honor to preside at the lecture, which to my surprise, has led to the publication of this pamphlet. But I have to do with Dr. Loring, as president of the Massachusetts Senate, and Mr. Sanford, speaker of the House. The former gave his casting vote against the people's side of the Hoosac tunnel question, and the latter left the chair to make a speech against it, and it was killed for this year, though, so close was the vote, that had not these two presiding officers been on the side of the corporations, the people's bill would have passed. Now the question arises, have Dr. Loring and Mr. Sanford received favors from the Massachusetts railways, which may be valued prospectively and retrospectively at from two to five thousand dollars? It will be said that all public men take railway passes. But they don't. I can mention two public men who are scrupulous in this respect, and hope there are many more. Judge Otis P. Lord, will not, I am assured on good authority, receive a pass from any railway company which may appear before him in court. Charles Sumner refuses railway passes, and while at London last summer, refused a free return ticket across the ocean, proffered simply as a token of respect.

The Eastern railroad managers are actively endeavoring to make the public believe that they have made a great change in their management, and decidedly for the better. How much better it is the public will judge, but there has been no material change. The Eastern railroad has been for many years managed by *two rings*, the prime object of both of which is to hold their power, and the two have long worked together with this single aim. The chief ring is the Hooper family, and the minor ring is made up of a few of the officers. The minor ring simply asks "to be let alone" in the matter of *parasite corporations* like that exposed between Prescott and Robinson by the theft of \$5,000 by the latter. Both these rings are intact to-day, and no essential change has been made. The two rings worked together at the time of Robinson's theft at Salem and Prescott's blunder at Hamilton, and both these glaring cases were adroitly covered out of sight. But the Revere disaster made more impression, and the chief ring charged the minor ring with leading them into the difficulty. The quarrel was measurably healed by making a

scapegoat of Conductor Nowland. Something of the sort was attempted with regard to Mr. President Browne, but he was simply a stubborn man selected by the Hooper Family because he was stubborn. Circumstances now demand that the public shall be met by a more plausible man, and he has been found. Five years later they may feel strong enough to defy the public once more, and get another stubborn man like Mr. Browne. Of late Prescott's incompetency has been too apparent, and *too costly*, so another has been chosen to do his work, but he is retained, and *the rings* remain as perfect as ever.

The managers of the Eastern railroad claim to have done much in the way of introducing new improvements, but this has been forced by the exposures at Seabrook and Revere, for before these calamities the Eastern was notorious for its want of improved equipment of all kinds. But the public should bear in mind that it is one thing to introduce new inventions and quite another thing to have them at the right place, at the proper moment, with men properly trained to use them. The use of air brakes illustrates this point forcibly. At Revere they had nothing but common brakes, while at Seabrook air brakes had been supplied, but the managers of the Eastern railroad contrived to rival the Dutch sailor who had an anchor, but it was *at home*—the air brake was out of the reach of the engineman! Mr. Westinghaus, doubtless, has a keen sense of the proper way of doing things, and having occasion to show his improved brake to the Earl of Caithness, and shortly afterwards to another company of gentlemen, he improved the occasions to show the managers of the Eastern railroad how to use the brake after they got it. Both parties were taken down to Revere, and the trials were made upon the East Boston branch. As if this were not sufficient, the Eastern railroad managers were invited to a dinner afterwards, which was appropriately held at the *Revere* house, and to make the lesson permanent he called upon Director Williams of the Eastern railroad for a speech, which was clinched by two of Mr. William's Salem friends, Hon. George B. Loring, and Rev. E. C. Bolles. This was certainly impressing the lesson fully, but what shall we think of a manager and superintendent that require such a terrible application of the proverb "line upon line and precept upon precept?" At one of these trials it was said that at Seabrook the cars having the Westinghaus brake were not injured, while those without it were destroyed. These words contain at once the truth and a gross deception. The cars having the brake were at the tail of the train, and were not injured because they were out of harm's way. The cars without the brake were crushed because of heavy cars behind them. Who then is responsible for the deception? Does the Eastern railroad employ such means to cover its blunders, or is the Westinghaus brake so hardly pressed by its rivals that recourse is had to such statements?

It is a matter of importance to inquire how far the verdicts of coroners' juries are tampered with by the influence of rich corporations, an evil which sometimes produces the opposite evil viz., that the coroner's jury, is made in extreme cases the instrument of popular vehemence against the corporation. At the time of the Castle Hill disaster the editor of one Salem paper dared to criticise the Eastern railroad. That man is now a coroner, and he holds a free pass on the railroad. At one time it was found that an unusual number of passes were held in that office, but it was said that one of them was issued to the coroner *as such*. But when attention was drawn to the fact that coroners had free passes, this same pass was said to be issued on newspaper account. In other words both the coroner and the railroad officials were ready to make either statement as occasion required. Such duplicity is a disgrace to Massachusetts. For a man to hold free passes on a railroad and write "puffs" of its managers, and then to hold an inquest on the bodies of persons killed by those managers is, to draw it mild, putting a man in a false position. In this case it leads to the inquiry whether that pass is issued because the coroner is known to have spoken fearlessly about the Eastern railroad in 1848. The community grows suspicious. It is not long since a juror raised a smile at an inquest by remarking that he supposed the jury was summoned merely to say that "no blame can be attached to the railway managers." The railway Company appears by counsel before coroners' juries, but it is very rare that the public interest is supported *by anybody*. The newspaper correspondents are likely to side with the railway Company from which they have free passes, and unpleasant truths are easily suppressed. The Seabrook disaster was made to appear as if arising from causes beyond human control, and two coroners' juries are said to have found verdicts favorable to the Eastern railroad, and yet the disaster arose from gross carelessness, and the Company has been compelled to pay very heavy damages. How this occurred may be inferred from the fact that while the jury was sitting the *Boston Advertiser* published comments in its correspondence, quite deciding the matter for the jury. This appeared immediately over the testimony offered by the president of the Eastern railroad, and looked as if it was inspired by him. The editor of the *Advertiser* has since said that the matter was improper, and put in without his knowledge, but the mischief was done, and he made no attempt to repair it. This was contempt of court, but how could a New Hampshire coroner enforce his penalties upon a Boston daily paper? It is true that a coronor's inquiry is only preliminary, but when it is the only legal investigation into causes of death, it becomes far too important to be kept under the thumb of a railroad Company. How far coroners' juries are under the thumb of the Eastern railroad we can best judge by examples. How far the inquiries

are carried the public is not informed, but the stereotyped verdict "no blame can be attached to the employees of the railroad" is uniformly rendered. Some months since a passenger on the Eastern railroad died from the effects of jumping from the train at Bridge St., Salem, because he found himself in the wrong train, and in this case the usual verdict was rendered. Shortly after this George Macdonald, the novelist and lecturer, found himself in the same predicament. He did not jump off, and the conductor told him that he would soon get to his destination in Peabody by taking a return train. Macdonald told the conductor that he got into the car in Boston marked "Peabody:" that he (the conductor) had twice punched his ticket without warning him that he was to change cars at Salem; that he was to lecture that evening, and unless he was taken to the Hall before 7.30, he should look to the Eastern railroad, and not the Peabody Institute, for his fee. This caused a hasty transfer of Macdonald to a hack in Beverly, and a ride at the expense of the Eastern railroad to Peabody. The hall was reached before 7.30 but Macdonald got no tea, and had to go without food from an early dinner till he could reach the house of his host in Salem late in the evening. The man who jumped at Bridge St. may have had as strong or a stronger case than Macdonald, which the coroner with a free pass in his pocket could not extract from the lifeless form that laid before his jury, and did not if he cared to, from the employees of the railway Company. Is it libelling Massachusetts to point out these things, or does the state disgrace herself by allowing them?

We should remember that the Eastern railroad is the great mail route from Boston to the state of Maine, a matter of no little importance, but if the European mails are to be landed at Halifax, it becomes a matter of paramount importance at least to Boston. for there are strong tendencies to divert the mail so that it may go direct to New York and avoid Boston, placing the latter almost as badly off for the railway mails as the removal of the Cunard line to New York placed it for the steamer mails. If the Eastern railroad is converted into a first-class mail line, it may do a handsome service to Boston, which has done so much for the Eastern railroad. But at present the fastest express train averages only twenty-five miles an hour—one half that of the English trains. These Express trains stop on an average every six or seven miles, and when the mails reach Boston they do not connect with another railway but have to be transported in carts. Such facilities are wholly inadequate for an efficient mail service, and Boston people must blame the Eastern railroad Company if the mails are diverted at Lawrence to Lowell and Worcester direct to New York. Not only does the Eastern railroad carry the mails slowly, but they are not carried *safely*. The two most severe disasters which have happened on New England railways for several years have been upon this Eastern railroad, and to

express trains running between Boston and Augusta and Bangor Maine. Both of these disasters proved the managers incompetent, but they are still in power.

Americans often complain of the attacks made upon the credit of American railways, particularly in the *London Times* upon those railways which apply to English capitalists for loans of money. But if they have such a record as the Eastern railroad, Americans are only doing justice to themselves by stating the case in advance. The time has gone by when everything American is to be defended by Americans simply because it is American. Things must be made to stand upon their own merits, and the *Times* renders a service to humanity when it honestly and searchingly attempts to trace out the origin of the great fires in American cities or the corruption on American railways. It is quite time that in the larger international relations of life that things should stand or fall by their merits.

In considering railway service we must bear in mind the arduous and responsible nature of the duties required, and the officers are entitled to every sympathy when human nature fails as fail it will sometimes, even when every reasonable precaution has been taken, but we must clearly distinguish between honesty and dishonesty, and between men who are qualified for the work and those who are manifestly incompetent. The Eastern railroad has been, and is now the prey of incompetent and dishonest men. They are entering into a fierce competition with the Boston and Maine railroad, which will test its capacity to the utmost. It was undoubtedly the spirit of competition with the the Boston and Maine railroad which led the Bangor express to be hurried off on the night of the fatal catastrophe at Revere, immediately after several accommodation trains. How they will meet the trials to come remains to be seen, but thus far it has been attended only with disaster to the Eastern railroad. How long the contest will continue or how far it will go, no one can tell, but the ultimate union of the two railroads is something not to be thought of until we are prepared to give up every advantage of competition. The union of the Eastern and Boston and Maine railroads means simply to give the control of the state of Maine and a portion of New Hampshire and Massachusetts to a private company, for control it means when railroads once become united and practically monopolise the carrying facilities of a large area of country. The control of government is not greater than such a control, and the question really is whether the people or railway managers are to govern the country. Would anyone consent to give the control of a river to a private company? And yet many railroads are more important channels of communication than rivers of the same length. The union of railways may sometimes be of advantage; but a complete remedy for existing evils can only be found in some system of State Control of our iron highways. It may be that

the state of Maine holding the position geographically as the first of states might well commence the system and do what it may to promote friendly relations with the Dominion of Canada, which so nearly surrounds her, and which extends liberal encouragement to her own immense railway system, which must ultimately extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Or it may be that Massachusetts, the leader in all reforms, must lead in this. Certain it is that better railroad management would greatly promote the prosperity of both Maine and Massachusetts and soon they would be able to borrow money in London at *four per cent*, and when Maine can meet the Dominion of Canada at the border and transport with the greatest speed and safety the European mails for Canada as well as the United States we may then realize what we should have to-day, mail communication from London to New York in a week, but to do this the Eastern railroad must improve on the present system of mail trains at 25 miles an hour.

The competition between the Boston, Maine, and Eastern Railroads, promises to be so fierce, that it has repeatedly been before the Massachusetts Legislature, in the form of a scheme for consolidating the two roads. But parties living along the Boston, and Maine railroad, remember how the Eastern contrived to manage the road from Portsmouth to Portland, under a contract providing for joint management, and how a short road connecting the two roads, and uniting the towns of Peabody and Wakefield is operated by the Eastern Railroad, as a *dead* railway, with utter unconcern for the prosperous villages of Rockville, South Lynnfield, and Montrose, which wholly depend upon it for railway communication. A similar line from Wakefield to Newburyport, would, if treated in the same way, place Lynnfield Center, Danvers, Topsfield, and Georgetown upon another dead railway, and indeed the scheme for consolidation is one to make the whole Boston and Maine railroad a *dead* line as regards the through travel from the state of Maine and Canada. Already the Eastern is throwing every possible obstacle in the way of Boston and Maine passengers at Portland, and is doing everything to make Malden, Wakefield, Lawrence Haverhill, and Dover stations on a dead railway, with as little hope of becoming points on a great highway to the state of Maine, as South Lynnfield has of becoming a large city. But the inhabitants of these places do not propose to submit to Eastern railroad rule—at least without a struggle. This feeling arises from no ill will against the Eastern railroad in itself considered, but simply because its managers have for years maintained a most unjust and injurious monopoly, while the Boston and Maine came into existence as the only competing railway that could effectually restrain monopoly. At present there seems to be nothing in prospect except a fierce and destructive competition unless measures of State control are speedily enacted. This has forced the Eastern into new fields *when it cannot properly manage what it has already*. It has

recently taken in hand the Hartford and Erie to New York, and the Maine Central and other roads in Maine and the Dominion of Canada. The Boston and Maine is an active competitor for Eastern travel, and makes connections to New York; it has the most of the travel at Saco, Wells and North Berwick as well as that of Malden, Somerville, and Charlestown. The Eastern taps the Boston and Maine at Great Falls, Dover, and Lawrence and competes for the White Mountain travel. The Boston and Maine taps the Eastern at Newburyport and Danvers, and now is a most attractive seashore route. If we are to have competition, and not monopoly, the Boston and Maine will have tracks to Lynn, Swampscott, Marblehead, Salem, Peabody, and Beverly—the most important places on the Eastern. It is a little singular that the best route from Salem to Boston has never been improved. The East Boston land interest was powerful enough to cause that island to become the terminus and communicate with the city by ferry. To obviate the difficulties of the ferry they might have ferried the cars across, or tunnelled Boston harbour, and had a depot at Faneuil Hall. But instead of that they built at great expense an extension into Boston so crooked as to enable the passengers to gaze at the four sides of Bunker Hill Monument and finally leave them after three miles of needless travel, upon the outer edge of Boston, at Causeway St., while the Boston and Maine land their passengers in their ample and central station at Haymarket Square. The Eastern Railroad managers again see the error of their ways and propose to tunnel Bunker Hill, but it would be much better to tunnel Boston Harbour and have a depot in State Street.

In this race of competition not the least drawback which the Eastern encounters is the alarming number of severely fatal accidents it has suffered, and if it is destined to become the central figure either with or without the Boston and Maine railroad in the greatest of New England railways from New York to Halifax it must improve in the *speed* and the *safety* of the mail trains. The managers of the Eastern Railroad shortly before the Revere disaster made a most unfortunate recognition of their humiliating liability to accident, and all the employees were required to sign an agreement that they would claim no damages in case they received an injury upon the railway. This agreement of course would not have not been held as binding by any court, but it reminds us that Robert Tombs thought he would like to call the roll of his slaves on Bunker Hill, when Massachusetts freemen are compelled to risk their lives on the most unsafe road in the State, and agree to forego all claim to damages, or lose their situations. How far compulsion is carried may be judged by the fact that a publisher of a Boston paper assures me that were he but to publish criticisms on the Eastern Railroad the managers would cause trouble enough in the delivery of his papers to cost him \$1000 per annum.

I believe the publication of these facts is as much for the interest of the shareholders as for the interest of the people, and all will agree that the suppression of unpleasant truths argues an unhealthy state of society. I hope I have not taken too much notice of the *Salem Gazette*. I have taken it simply as a type of its species as the *Gazette* has been published for 105 years (except that it suspended publication for a short period at the commencement) and is therefore a fair representative of the *old foggy* local journals. This subject has grown in my mind and upon my hands from a trifling local allusion in a lyceum lecture, but the subject relates to something more than the simple fact that towns and cities are under the complete control, for indispensable service, of a board of directors of a private company. It affects the credit of Massachusetts. It affects the prosperity of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont, especially the first. It affects the credit of the two great railway and commercial centres of New England—Boston and Portland. It makes the rate of interest higher giving the Dominion of Canada a great advantage for she can hire money at four per cent, while England pays only three. It opens our relations with Canada upon a hundred questions, particularly mails, ocean transport, fisheries and general commerce. And finally it reaches the English and European money markets and damages American credit.

No railroad only 40 miles long ever before had three such terrible disasters as those at Castle Hill, Hamilton and Revere, within the space of fifteen miles, and the last, terrible as it was, was followed by another precisely similar, and even more severe, the next (last) year, and all arising from inexcusable negligence. No railroad perhaps ever found coroners so pliable. No railroad ever had directors, treasurers, superintendents and managers so capable of using the stockholders' money and evading the responsibility. No road ever before, not even the Erie, could marshall in proportion to its length, so many editors and politico-officials, to do its bidding. And it is doubtful if any railroad with such ample means, ever passed its dividends for so long a period, or was compelled to have recourse to borrowing money to such an extent, or was more effectually preyed upon by parasites among its own officials. The official who is responsible for the calamities at Hamilton and Revere and Seabrook, and whose recklessness did not culminate in these three cases without many others that never reached the public ear, stands charged with having advertised a train without giving orders for it to start! The passengers came at the time appointed, 11 p. m., and had to find a horse and drive to Somerville and waken the recreant official and bring him to Boston. No man is perfect, and mistakes must be forgiven, but even editors cannot convince the public that blunder after blunder, and repeated killing and wounding is to be condoned. The simple truth is that we must have prompt and effectual railroad reform, and nowhere is it so urgently *needed than upon THE EASTERN RAILROAD OF MASSACHUSETTS.*



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